ABSTRACT
Introduction
Globalization of production processes has gained rapid momentum in the 1990s, making it easier for foreign multinational companies to manage and control geographically dispersed production networks and supply chains. At the same time there has been a signicant shift in the attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing/emerging countries: the discussion among academics and policymakers has shifted from whether FDI should be encouraged to how developing countries can attract FDI. Many international development agencies including the World Bank now consider FDI as one of the most eective tools in the global ght against poverty.
There is a general consensus in the literature that greater host corruption increases the cost of doing businesses in a host country, which in turn may place some emerging economies with weak institutions at a relative disadvantage. Bribes paid to government ocials could be regarded as additional taxes, which in turn waste essential resources as it does not increase productivity (see Murphy et al., 1991; Vishny, 1993 Wei, 1997) . Rose-Ackermann (1999) argues that paying bribes may help a foreign rm to win a contract, but it also exposes it to future extortion attempts. The latter may be further aggravated by the fact that corruption contracts are not enforceable in courts (see Boycko et al., 1995) . Higher costs increase the uncertainty of returns to foreign investment and may in turn lower a country's locational attractiveness (see Bardhan, 1997 ). As such, more corrupt host countries are less likely to attract foreign investment which receives some empirical support (e.g., Globerman and Shapiro, 1999; 2003; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Aseidu, 2008) .
However the eect of corruption is by no means unambiguous and may vary somewhat depending on the measure of FDI (size of FDI or size of foreign ownership), that of corruption or related risk factor and also the country of study (e.g., Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Hines 1995; Wei, 1997; Egger and Winner ; Javorcik and Wei, 2009 ). Nevertheless, it is dicult to deny that a large amount of FDI ows to countries with imperfect governance, e.g., those in Asia, Africa, Latin America (see Figure 1) . In this context, we examine the nature and causes of this non-linearity, if any, in the relationship between corruption and foreign ownership. It is an important exercise as it is important to understand the extent to which corruption is a threat for attracting foreign investment, after taking account of all possible factors inuencing foreign investment; otherwise the estimated eects of corruption is likely to be biased. In the process, the exercise also allows us to identify some possible mechanisms that may explain the perceived non-linear eects of corruption, thus yielding important policy implications.
It is argued here that corruption in many host countries is likely to have only limited impact on inward FDI unless the level of corruption is too high. This is because there are large potential gains to be had from these foreign investments especially when the host country has great potentials depending on the size of its economy and/or output growth rate. So long as the expected returns exceed the expected costs of foreign investment in a host country, the likelihood of foreign entry and also the size of foreign ownership may increase with host corruption, until corruption reaches a threshold. However, the entry and/or foeign ownership may fail to have a similar relationship when the level of corruption is too high when the costs of corruption may more than or exactly outweigh the returns to foreign investment; the latter may yield a negative or insignicant relationship. We argue that this non-liniearity in the corruptionforeign ownership relationship can, to some extent, be attributed to various mechanisms adopted by foreign multinationals, e.g., investing in countries with familiar environment and/or some formal/informal networking, with a view to limit the damages caused by host corruption and/or other unfamiliarity attached to foreign investment. Not surprisingly the eect of corruption on foreign entry, FDI or foreign ownership would be biased if these factors are ignored.
Recent empirical studies in the organizational behaviour literature (e.g., Boisot and Child, 1996) suggest that informal networks are often a response to inadequate institutional support. These networks usually involve an exchange of favors, making businesses easier for the members, thus reducing the risks of operating in a foreign environment. While exchange within the networks does not rely on explicitly written contracts, relationships between the members are guided by certain norms/conventions. Thus, a foreign rm may nd it easier to invest in neighbouring countries with common border, common language and/or some diplomatic/cultural links, which may, to some extent, promote cross-border trust irrespective of higher host corruption.
Foreign multinationals may also make use of formal organisational networks to minimise the risks of investment in more corrupt host countries. This is because rms that form networked organisations can better protect themselves from corrupt ocials. Associations thus become a medium of coordination, information transfer, and representation. They create safeguards for members against bureaucratic intervention and extortion. By pooling their resources, organized rms can better ght corruption by either increasing public awareness or employing legal protection. The more widespread the corruption is, the greater the gains derived from joining such associations will be. In this respect, we examine the benets that parent rms from EU or OECD home and host countries may receive by investing in sample EU/OECD host countries in central and eastern Europe. In addition to the EU's commitment to stability of democracy, rule of law, human rights, protection of minorities and capacity to cope with competition and market forces, EU accession opens up the possibility of resolving any potential conict by appealing to the European Court of Justice (rather than the national court in any of these CEE countries), thus hedging the fear of high corruption in the host nation, at least to some extent. Similar networking eect may be evident within OECD, where member countries are committed to democracy and market economy and are required to co-ordinate domestic and international policies of its members. OECD members are also responsible to comply with the multilateral agreement on investment and international actions on corruption and bribery abroad. Accordingly, parent rms from EU/OECD parent countries may seek to invest in EU/OECD host countries in the CEE region, as membership of these organizations stimulates the transfer of information among members about eective strategies of confronting corruption, helps develop legal protection mechanisms, provides better access to political decision makers to report instances of low level corruption, and makes bureaucratic misdeeds more visible.
Further, over the last two decades or so FDI (as proportion of total FDI outows) from developing countries is sharply rising. UNCTAD data suggests that the share of FDI from developing countries has increased from about 6.19% in 1986-1990 to about 18% by 2010. The nature of such FDI is also changing, from being mainly in natural resource industries to being much more broadly based (Mlachila and Takebe 2011) . This changing pattern may reect the greater ability and experience of multinational rms from developing countries to cope with dicult economic environments characterised by weak institutions, which in turn may help them to cope with similar conditions elsewhere in many ways: (i) unlike foreign multinationals from developed countries, these developing country MNCs can better manage unreliable supply chains, unreliable power supplies, low-skilled and diverse workers in less developed host countries. (ii) They know the importance of contacts and relationships to navigate through regulatory obstacles and weak contract enforcement. (iii) Outward investors from developing countries are also used to bribery in their home countries, and are not normally constrained by their home-country laws in their foreign operations (unlike OECD anti-bribery law abroad, for example). In other words, parent rms from a corrupt home nation may nd it easier to invest in a host country with similar corrupt environment. A possible indicator of institutional similarity between home and host nations could be the distance between home and host corruption. We thus hypothesize that the lower the distance between home and host corruption (i.e., the greater the familiarity of parent rms with corrupt host environment), the greater would be the parent rm's ability to cope with the corrupt host environment and hence more FDI into host countries irrespective of host corruption.
Using Orbis rm-level data from Bureau Van Djik for the period 2002-2008, we generate host-home matched information to test the hypotheses of interest. While there is a large number of existing studies examining the eect of corruption and/or weak governance on foreign investment, foreign entry or mode of foreign entry (Javorcik and Wei, 2009) , most have assumed a linear relationship. 2 In view of the non-parametric hump-shaped relationship between foreign ownership and host corruption noted in our sample (see Figure 3) , we investigate if there is a minimum level of host corruption beyond which greater host corruption would lower foreign ownership. In this respect, we consider the quartile distribution of the host corruption index (e.g., Q2, Q3, Q4 relative to the reference category Q1) in our sample. 3 As such, we exploit the variation in corruption across countries and over time to identify its causal eect on foreign ownership. Secondly, we attempt to explain the observed corruption-foreign ownership relationship in terms of various networking mechanisms adopted by foreign MNCs to cope with the possible adverse eects of host corruption: (i) EU/OECD membership link between host and home countries; (ii) home-host institutional similarlity; the latter is measured by the rst quartile of the absolute distance between home and host corruption in our sample. Accordingly, in addition to the host corruption quartiles and these additional networking arguments, we include the interaction terms between each of these arguments (i)-(ii) and host corruption quartiles (Q2, Q3 and Q4). The latter allows us to identify the dierential eect of each of these networking arguments (i)-(ii) in the presence of a given level of host corruption. Insignicance of any of these interaction coecients would however highlight that the potential positive and negative eects of corruption outweigh each other in the presence of these forms of networking. We primarily use xed eects OLS estimates of percentage foreign ownership (as a measure of foreign investment) with correction for selectivity bias (a la Wooldridge 1995) arising from foreign entry (only 16% of sample rms had some foreign ownership) decision. We also check the robustness of our estimates in various ways (see further discussion in section 4).
The existing literature typically focuses on corruption in host countries, which has been extended to related (and highly correlated) institutional measures of rule of law, property rights and political freedom. In general, most studies nd an adverse eect of host corruption on FDI at country (Kaufman et al. 1999 Wei 1997 Wei , 2000 level, generally using single/pooled crosssection method. A few papers, however, nd a positive impact of corruption on FDI in specic instances where thriving corruption may facilitate wealth creation by entrepreneurs. For example, Le (1964) suggests that in the presence of regulations and other administrative controls, corruption can act as a helping hand to foster FDI. Multinational rms might be willing to pay bribes in order (i) to speed up bureaucratic process to obtain permission to set up business (Lui 1985) and (ii) to gain access to publicly funded projects (Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000) , which is again highlighted by Egger and Winner (2005) . Our analysis appears to integrate why both positive and negative eects of corruption may be possible as we account for possible networking mechanisms to explain the observed non-linear eects of corruption.
Correcting for the selectivity bias of entry, we nd that Q2 and Q3 levels of corruption may be associated with signicantly higher foreign ownership while Q4 level of corruption remains insignicant, thus conrming the hypothesis of non-linearity in corruption. Next, we examine if the networking hypothesis may explain this observed non-linearity. There is indeed some conrmation that foreign ownership is signicantly higher when EU/OECD parent rms invest in EU/OECD host countries in our sample and the signicance of corruption per se vanishes altogether in these cases. Also, we nd that a lower distance in corruption between the home and the host countries (when the distance between home and host corruption is less than its rst quartile value) is associated with a signicantly higher foreign ownership as host corruption increases from Q1 to Q2 and Q3; however the eect turns out to be insignicant when host corruption is high at Q4 level, as we predicted. Our results are robust to using alternative corruption measures (ICRG and TI) as well as additional control variables including GDP, GDP growth rate, home-host common border. Access to panel data is clearly an advantage of our analysis over much of the existing literature, as it helps minimising the bias arising from the unobserved rm and year specic factors. We follow Wooldridge (1995) to obtain the selection corrected xed eects estimates of foreign ownership and argue that these corrected estimates are superior to the alternative Tobin or Heckman selection estimates using pooled data.
In an attempt to compare our results with Javorcik and Wei (2009), the nal section also determines two categorical foreign ownership variables (categorical variable FO, distinguishing SS from majority and minority JV, and a second binary variable FO_SS distinguishing between sole foreign subsidiary (SS) and foreign joint venture (JV)). These additional results are broadly in line with our basic results; these also highlight similarities and dierences with Javorcik and Wei (2009). Ceteris paribus, we nd that the within-sector likelihood of SS is lower at Q3 level of corruption for both FO and FO_SS though remains insignicant for Q4 level of corruption. However, the likelihood of SS is higher for Q2 and Q3 levels of corruption when there is low relative corruption. Evidently, these results hold even after controlling for sector xed eects, so that we do not nd a dierential eect for technologically sophisticated rms in our sample. Clearly, this is a more general result than Javorcik and Wei (2009). We argue that this can be attributed to the panel structure of the data which captures the trade-o between SS and JV better, since there are important learning process involved. Further we argue that the additional cost of JV is not only pertinent for technologically sophisticated rms, but also for rms in other sectors, as the cost of leakage attached to JV may not only petain to technology transfer, but also that pertaining to management strategy, often through the labour market (Tsang, 1994) . This is supported by our data, which is an important value added to the existing literature (see further discussion in section 4).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the econometric model while Section 3 describes the data set used in the analysis and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results while the nal section concludes.
Data Description
The dataset used in this paper has primarily been drawn from ORBIS, which is a comprehensive and rich rm-level dataset and has been widely used (e.g. Orbis shows rm-level ownership (direct as well as total) information by shareholder type (indicating country-of-ownership); it may further provide the parent-identication number in which case we were able to link the parent rm characteristics to the host rm. In cases where host rms have information on foreign ownership and ownership shares but do not show parent identication numbers or the information on the parent rm is not disclosed or limited, we are not able to include these rms in our analysis. Out of a total of 9185 manufacturing rms 5 operating in 12 CEE countries available from Orbis, 2,458 host rms were linked to a parent rm in our sample for 2002-2008 6 . This produces a large data-set of host rms drawn from 12 CEE host countries including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia and Ukraine. 7 Some of the sample host countries like Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia became EU members in 2004 while Bulgaria and Romania joined EU in 2007. There are some OECD members as well among the sample host countries and the list includes Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia while Slovenia became one of the newest members of OECD as late as 2010; we did not include Slovenia as OECD country in our analysis as we focus on pre-2010 period.
There is a wide range of home countries in our sample. The list is dominated by foreign investors from the US and the old EU countries including France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK, Denmark and Sweden. There are also parent rms from other OECD (e.g., Australia, Canada, Japan), newly emerging (e.g., Brazil, China, India and Russia) countries as well as those from the middle-east (e.g., Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey). However, on average, home rms from various OECD countries dominate the sample host rms, comprising about of 87% of the total observations while 68% of sample host rms attract investment from rms from old EU countries.
Among various possible institutional features, our analysis of foreign ownership primarily focuses on the role of corruption. This has two advantages. First, corruption can be seen as a key single indicator of institutional quality as it reects the impact of underlying institutional inputs including poor protection of property rights, excessive and arbitrary regulation, and weak informal institutions including social norms and values shaping human behaviour into one output indicator that describes the quality of the interface between businesses and public administration. Corruption is multi-dimensional and difcult to quantify. We primarily rely on corruption data from International Risk Country Guide (ICRG) compiled by Political Risk Services Group, which are consistent with measures available either directly from Transparency Interna- 5 Manufacturing rms in our sample are dened as those categorised by sector 16-32. 6 We choose this subsample as we need to use a balanced sample for estimation; see further discussion in section 3. 7 We did not include countries where we would have less than 5 rms (e.g. Macedonia, Moldova etc.). The smallest country in our sample has at least 100 rms at some point in the panel period. tional (TI) or from the Heritage Foundation/ Wall Street Journal (see footnote to Table 1 for the variable denition). 8 The ICRG corruption index is concerned with the actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. These insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and inecient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development of the black market. The index varies between a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5 in our sample; we have adjusted the corruption index in such a way that a higher value of the index reects higher corruption. Other corruption measures, e.g. Kaufmann et al. (1999) (which became Worldwide Governance Indicators project by World Bank) are also used (e.g., see Javorcik and Wei, 2009 by the TI draws on assessments and opinion surveys carried out by independent and reputable institutions. These surveys and assessments include questions related to the bribery of public ocials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and the eectiveness of public sector anti-corruption eorts. Perceptions are used because corruption is to a great extent a hidden activity that is dicult to measure. As with ICRG index, we adjust the CPI index in such a way that a higher value reects higher level of corruption. Table 1 summarises the means and standard deviations of both ICRG Transparency International (TI) corruption indices for individual CEE host countries in our sample. In general, most of the host countries have an index above 3 with the exception of Russia and Ukraine (both of which have an average over 4). The lowest ICRG corruption index is noted in Czech Republic. Second, as with ICRG index, an inter-country variation in the mean is noted in the distribution of CPI. In general the averages are comparable between these two alternative corruption indices; further, the pattern of this variation is roughly similar to those observed for ICRG corruption index: the lowest CPI is observed in Czech Republic, while the highest is in Ukraine (4.42), closely followed by Russia (4.17).
Foreign investment is measured by the percentage of foreign ownership in host rms in sample CEE countries. About 16% of sample host rms had some positive percentage share of foreign ownership. Panel a of Figure 2 shows the distribution of percentage of foreign ownership for all rms while that in panel b shows that for rms with some foreign ownership in our sample. These gures highlight the skewed nature of the distribution of foreign ownership. While more than 80% of sample rms do not have any foreign ownership, about 6% of all rms with foreign ownership are fully owned foreign subsidiaries. Considering the rms with some foreign ownership, the average percentage of foreign ownership is about 80% for the sample as a whole. Further, about 63% of all rms with positive foreign ownership have 90% or higher foreign ownership while as high as 56% of sample rms with positive foreign ownership have sole foreign ownership. There is also a signicant inter-country variation in foreign ownership: the mean is as high as 89% in the Czech Republic closely followed by Poland (86%), Slovakia (84%), Estonia (83%), Romania (82%), Latvia (81%) and Hungary (80%), all being members of the EU-2004. At the other end of the scale, the lowest average foreign ownership is observed in Ukraine (58%) followed by Bulgaria (62%), which joined the EU in 2007. However, in general, the sample host countries, who are members of EU or OECD, tend to have higher average foreign ownership (around 85%) compared to the overall average of about 80% for all CEE sample host countries taken together.
It is also interesting to explore the distribution of the home countries across host rms in our sample. While Baltic countries tend to have major investments from parent rms from Scandinavian countries, German rms are key investors in Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland), and Italian rms tend to invest predominantly in Romania. The latter seems to highlight an aspect of physical proximity, which may also entail some socio-cultural link most notably in terms of language between home and host rms. US parent rms are important exceptions, which are found in all the sample countries, but most notably in Latvia, Ukraine, Slovakia and Bulgaria. Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between corruption and foreign ownership in our sample using both ICRG and TI indices. The Epanechnikov non-parametric kernel scatter plot between percentage foreign ownership and proper host corruption (scaled) highlights a non-linear relationship between host corruption and foreign ownership. Clearly there is very little variation in foreign ownership (within 5 percentage points) as corruption increases from 1 to 3.5 or so. The share of foreign ownership reaches its peak of about 83% when host corruption is around 3.5 and thereafter it falls steeply reaching a minimum of around 68% or so when the host corruption is around 4.5. Similar pattern is observed for the TI index as well. We take this as evidence of a non-linear pattern in the relationship beween corruption and foreign ownership in our sample where the adverse eect of corruption seems to be binding only when corruption index exceeds 3.5 or so.
Empirical Model
Having explored the data in section 2, we shall now consider some parametric models of foreign ownership to examine.
Our central hypothesis is to explore the link between corruption on the one hand and foreign ownership on the other and in this respect we are particularly interested to explore the nature of non-linear relationship, if any, as highlighted in Figure 3 . It is however important to distinguish the decision to enter a host market from the size of the ownership held by foreign multinationals, which also determines the mode of entry. This is because only a fraction (about 16%) of sample rms have some foreign ownership. If one is interested in identifying the eect of corruption (among others) as a possible determinant of foreign ownership of a particular group of sample rms, the dierence between rms with and without foreign ownership would determine whether an issue of selection bias arises. To illustrate this, one needs to characterize each rm by endowments of observable and unobservable characteristics. If the rms with foreign investment have similar endowments of characteristics as those without, there is no reason to suspect selectivity bias will be induced by examining the subsample of rms with foreign investment. In other words, if the sample of rms with foreign investment is randomly chosen, the average characteristics, in terms of both observable and unobservables, of the subsample should be similar to the average characteristics of the population. Alternatively, one can consider the case where the foreign investment in a subsample of rms is no longer random and consequently the sample rms with and without foreign investment potentially have dierent characteristics. Sample selection bias arises when some component of the foreign entry decision is relevant to the process of determining the size of foreign ownership at the second stage; that is, when some of the determinants of the entry decision are also inuencing the ownership. When the relationship between the entry decision and the size of foreign ownership is purely through the observables, one can control for this by including the appropriate conditioning variables in the ownership equation. Thus, sample selection bias will not arise purely because of dierences in observable characteristics.
Clearly, presence of unobservable rm characteristics may also inuence estimates of percentage of foreign ownership at the second stage. The latter is particularly problematic when these unobservable characteristics are correlated with the observable characteristics, leading to incorrect inference regarding the impact of the observables. In order to minimise this potential omitted variable bias, one needs to control for as many factors as possible. Fortunately, we have access to panel data where the value of foreign ownership may change over time. Hence, we can adopt the panel data xed eects model that would allow us to identify the true eect of corruption by exploiting the within rm variation of unobserved factors over time.
However the standard panel data xed eects models do not control for selectivity bias. Hence, we follow Wooldridge (1995) who devises a selectivity corrected xed eects panel data model where the unobserved component is allowed to be correlated with observable explanatory variables in the primary ownership equation of interest. This is an improvement over Verbeek and Nijman (1992), who consider a random eects (RE) model under the assumptions of normality and serial independence of the idiosyncratic errors in both the selection and regression equations. Nijman and Verbeek (1992) and Zabel (1992) study almost the same model except they allow both unobserved eects to be correlated with the observables. Vella and Verbeek (1992) extend Nijman and Verbeek (1992) to allow for functions of the endogenous censoring variable to appear among the explanatory variables. In order to make the selection equation simple to estimate, Wooldridge (1995) makes a normality assumption on the errors in the selection equation, but allows these errors to display arbitrary serial correlation and unconditional heteroskedasticity. Given that foreign ownership information in our sample is bounded between 0 and 100 (in percentage term), the Heckman/Wooldridge model excludes the rms when foreign ownership is 0. In particular, truncation at the second stage would imply that we ignore the part of the distribution when percentage foreign ownership is zero.
The primary equation of our interest pertains to the percentage foreign ownership Y it of i-th rm in year t. Suppose Y it * is the latent endogenous variable attached to the observed counterpart of Y it , which is a function of a set of exogenously given explanatory variables X it and where errors u it are independently and identically distributed:
where i =1,2,...., N and t = 1,2, ....,T. Equation (1) includes one period lagged values of explanatory variables X as we try to minimise any potential bias arising from the simultaneity between Y and X variables. The model explicitly covers the case where δ i is allowed to be correlated with X it , so that all elements of X it are time-varying; this allows for time dummies and interactions of time dummies with time-invariant variables. If all T periods are available for any cross-section drawn from the population, a sucient condition for xed eects (and a variety of other procedures) to be consistent as N→ ∞ is: E(u i / δ i , X i1 , ... ,X iT ) = 0, for all t = 1, 2,...,T . Under this assumption, xed eects estimates are consistent as N→ ∞. For the usual FE standard errors and test statistics to be valid one would also need a second assumption that E(ui, ui'/ δ i , X i ) = σ 2 I T . Let us now introduce the possibility of selection in this framework. Suppose the vector of selection is given by
is observed only when F it =1 for t=1,2,....,T. Here F it takes a value 1 if the i-th host rm has some foreign ownership in a given year t and 0 otherwise. Thus foreign ownership Y it is observed only when the rm has any foreign investment. Suppose for a given t, t = 1,2,...., T, F * i is a latent variable attached to F i , which is determined as follows:
In equation (2) Z i is the set of explanatory variables explaining F i in a given year t. Z could include all variables included in X or could be a subset of X. Technically this does not aect one's ability to carry out correcting for selection bias, but it helps if one has exclusion restrictions in (2), which are not included in (1) .
The set of explanatory variables Z used for the determination of the selection equation of foreign entry at the rst stage includes characteristics of host rms (size, age, real cash ow, share of intangible assets, market share, TFP) and also host corruption measures Q2, Q3 and Q4 . Note that real cash ow of host rms are not included in X as this is likely to be more pertinent for the entry rather than the size of the ownership decision. Z also includes an index of host country infrastructure which is likely to be a direct determinant of locational decision of foreign multinationals. This is because access to existing public infrastructure in a host country will reduce costs of production and hence is likely to boost higher rate of return to foreign investment, other factors remaining unchanged. Further, Z does not include parent rms' characteristics as these are relevant only for determination of foreign ownership equation (1) at the second stage. First, we estimate the selection equation (2) of foreign entry F i for each year t, t=2002,....2008, which in turn enables us to derive a year-specic estimate of λ it , i.e., the inverse Mill's ratios (IMRs).
At the second stage selecting rms with some foreign onwerhsip, i.e., when F i =1, the selection corrected foreign ownership will be determined as follows:
where we insert the λ it , i.e., the inverse Mill's ratios (IMRs) generated from the rst stage estimates of equation (2) . T i is a time dummy that takes value 1 for the i-th year and 0 otherwise. Note that the value of ownership depends not only on the lagged X it−1 variables, but also on the rm-specic time averages of X it characteristics, i.e.,x i , along with the time dummies T i as well as their interactions with the IMRs. The set of control variables X refers to the selected characteristics of host rms (e.g., rm size, market share, TFP and share of intangible assets) as well as those (e.g., (size, share of intangible assets) for the parent rms . Further, we include a binary variable to control for the host country's adherence, if any, to competition policy as this can particularly induce a foreign multinational to invest more in a host country. More importantly, assuming that the xed eects δ i depend on the time averages of X it , i.e., (x i ), over t=1, 2,......,T, Wooldridge (1995) establishes that the simplest consistent estimate of (3) would be a pooled OLS. All standard errors are clustered at the host rm level, which allows us to control for the correlation, if any, in errors over time for a given rm. Successful implementation of Wooldridge (1995) requires us to generate a balanced panel and hence we only use the sample of rms which has complete information for the period 2002-08. Wooldridge (1995) proved that the relevant FE estimates from equation (1) would be consistent and asymmetrically normal as N→ ∞ only if E(u i /δ i , X i , F i ) = 0 for t = 1,2,....,T. Also, for the usual xed eects variance-covariance matrix and inference to be valid, a sucient additional assumption is Var(
Hypotheses
Clearly Figure 3 highlights the non-linearity in the relationship between corruption and foreign ownership in our sample in terms of kernet plot. In order to model this parametrically, we create three measures of corruption from the quartile of distributions of each corruption index, ICRG as well as TI, namely, second (Q2), third (Q3) and fourth (Q4) quartile values of these corruption indices. Accordingly, we modify equation (3) as follows:
We expect that the sign and signicance of the estimated coecients of these corruption quartile variables, namely, CQ2, CQ3 and CQ4, will account for the non-linear eect of corruption, if any, on foreign ownership (relative to the reference category CQ1, i.e., corruption quartile 1) at the second stage. We may expect, without any loss of generality, that some level of corruption may encourage higher foreign ownership leading to sole foreign subsidiary, which may not hold at a higher level of corruption (which was also assumed by Javorcik and Wei, but was not empirically tested). In the absence of any prior evidence, we use our data to explore the relationship between corruption and foreign ownership in our sample (see Table 4 for these results). 9 Next we examine the possible factors explaining the observed non-linear corruption-foreign ownership relationship as highlighted in Figure 3 . In this respect, we take account of the possible networking mechanisms adopted by foreign multinationals to cope with the adverse eects of host corruption. These estimates are summarized in specications (1)- (5) in Table 6 (see further discussion in section 4). First, we consider the lowest quartile (rc_q1) of absolute distance between home and host corruption to account for the institutional similarlity between home and host countries (see column 1 of Table 6 ). As such, we also interact the rst quartile of relative corruption rc_q1 with Q2, Q3 and Q4 values of host corruption (rc_q1*corruption_q2, rc_q1*corruption_q3, rc_q1*corruption_q4). Next, we consider the cases of formal networking between foreign rms from old EU member countries and as such, we augment (3) by a binary variable eu_eu that takes value 1 if EU home countries invest in EU host countries; we also include the interactions of eu_eu with the three quartile values of host corruption (eu_eu_corruption_q2, eu_eu_corruption_q3 and eu_eu_corruption_q4); these estimates are summarized in column 2 of the table. In alternative specications, we do the same for OECD parent rms investing in OECD host rms and generate a second binary variable oecd_oecd (see column 3 of Table 6 ). Along similar lines, we also consider the possibility that a parent rm from EU/OECD countries may invest in any EU/OECD host rms and to this end generate a third binary variable both_eu_oecd (see column (4) of Table 6 and further discussion in section 4). As before, we also include the interaction between oecd_oecd (or both_eu_oecd) and host corruption quartiles (Q2, Q3, Q4). The nal column (5) of Table 6 shows the estimates of the most complete specication: here we include both measures of institutional simialarity (rc_q1) as well as EU/OECD home-host networking arguments together with their respective interactions with the host corruption quartiles Q2, Q3, Q4. The underlying idea is that networking with EU/OECD countries or host countries with similar corruption environment is likely to reduce the cost of entry as well setting up a new plant in a corrupt host country, at least to some extent; the latter in turn may enhance the attractiveness of sole foreign subsidiary (SS) as opposed to joint venures (JV).
We start our estimates using ICRG corruption indices and then test the robustness of our results by comparing the initial results with those obtained by using the alternative CPI measures provided by TI. Further we compare the Wooldridge panel data xed eects estimates of the baseline foreign ownership (%) regression with the corresponding pooled Heckman and tobit estimates with a view to identify the advantages of Wooldridge, which not only controls for selectivity bias, but also minimises the omitted variable bias (see Table 5 ). Table 6 (columns 1-5) then shows the Wooldridge rm/year and also rm*year (that captures rm-specic trends) FE estimates of percentage foreign ownership using various networking arguments as decribed above. Some may however raise concern that home-host networking between EU/OECD countries or countries with similar corruption environment may be correlated with the index of eocnomic development of the host country. We nd that, if any, the correlation between GDP and EU/OECD membership of host countries is likely to be rather indirect as the EU/OECD entry criteria is not directly based on GDP, but related to competitive environment and institutional requirement. In fact, the sample correlations between host EU and OECD membership with GDP turn out to be 0.13 and 0.02 respectively. Nevertheless we test the robustness of our estimates by augmenting the model specication by GDP, GDP growth (see estimates summarised in AppendixTable A3), if any. Given that host GDP and GDP growth also determine the returns from foreign investment, it also allows us to identify the net eect of corruption with a view to test the robustness of our baseline results.
Given that we use rm xed eects, we envisage that missing country-level characteristics will be confounded in the rm-level xed eects. Some may still argue that there could be time-varying omitted factors which may still bias our estimates. Note that we have already included rm-specic time dummies as captured by rm*year xed eects, which we hope would control for the rmlevel time-varying omitted factors. For the remaining time-varying omitted factors, our estimates will still go through so long as these omitted factors are negatively correlated with the error term, in which case our estimates will be biased downwards; if so, our estimates could be regarded as the lower bound of the true estimates.
Finally, we compare of our results with Javorcik and Wei (2009) and as such construct some catgorical (FO) and binary (FO_SS) ownership variables dierentiating sole foreign subsidiary from various types of JV (majority and minority). The underlying idea is that greater corruption will increase the cost of sole foreign subsidiary not only in setting up a new plant, but also of doing day-to-day businesses in a corrupt host country, all by itself. Witout much loss of generality, it can however be assumed that over time these additional costs of SS may decline as the foreign investor gets familiar with the system. In contrast, higher host corruption may may increase the relative attractiveness of joint venture (JV) where one may receive some help and support from the local collaborators to deal with local bureaucrats; however, at the same time, JV may involve some additional cost of information leakage (related to both technology and management strategy), which may also increase over time. As such it is important to use panel data methods as ours to understand the eect of corruption on mode of foreign entry, which is further discussed in section 4.4.
Both between rms and within-rm means and standard deviations of all regression variables are summarized in Table 2 .
Results and Discussion
In this section we analyse the estimates with a view to interpret them vis-a-vis the central hypotheses of interest. In an attempt to minimise the simultaneity bias, if any, all explanatory variables are lagged by one year; also, all standard errors are clustered at the rm level with a view to minimise the correlation of errors over years for a given rm.
First stage estimates of foreign entry
The distribution of foreign ownership is rather skewed to the right. For example, out of a total rm-year observations of 387831, there are 63027 rmyear observations with some positive foreign ownership in our sample so that the total observations with foreign ownership greater than or equal to 1% is about 16 .25% in our sample. We accordingly generate a Foreign entry variable called Foreign1 which takes a value 1 if foreign ownership is greater than or equal to 1% and 0 otherwise. Since only about 16% of sample rms had some foreign ownership, rst we estimate probit foreign entry estimates for Foreign1 for each of the sample years as shown in Table 3 using ICRG corruption index (the corresponding Foreign 1 estimates using TI are shown in Appendix Table  A1 ).
In order to explore the non-linear relationship between host corruption and foreign ownership, we consider the quartile distribution of each of the corruption indices. This is a natural way to explore the non-linearity rather than arbitrarily imposing our own threshold values. In our sample 2nd quartile (Q2) value of ICRG corruption index is 3.5 while the corresponding third quartile (Q3) value is 4. Clearly there is some variation in the eect of corruption on the likelihood of foreign entry across the sample years. Ceteris paribus, we nd that greater host corruption is not necessarily associated with lower likelihood of foreign entry. In particular, host corruption Q2 , Q3 and Q4 levels are associated with signicantly higher likelihood of foreign entry respectively in the years 2002-07, 2003-05 and 2006-08. The estimates for Q4 level of corruption is interesting: while the estimate of Q4 was negative in the earlier years (2003-05), but turned positive and signcant from 2006 onwards as the EU accession process deepened. We obtain comparable results when using TI corruption index.
Among other results, there is suggestion that younger, larger and more productive host rms are more likely to attract any foreign investment; also, greater cashow of the host company is associated with higher while greater market share with lower likelihood of foreign entry. Wile R&D of the host rm does not seem to play any signicant role here, better access to host infrastructure signicantly improves the prospect of attracting foreign investment in our sample. In general, these results conrm our expectations.
We use both ICRG and TI indices to generate two sets of inverse Mill's ratios for each rm for each year, which are then used to construct the IMR term λ it to estimate equation (3), i.e., the selectivity corrected estimates of foreign ownership (see section 4.2 below) .
Selectivity corrected panel FE-OLS Wooldridge estimates of foreign ownership
Selectivity corrected estimates of percentage foreign ownership are summarised in Table 4 . Columns (1)- (2) of Table 4 show the estimates using ICRG index while those in columns (3)-(4) show estimates using TI corruption index. Since the selection correction term lambda is signicant in both cases, we couch our discussion in terms of the corrected estimates shown in columns (2) and (4) respectively for ICRG and TI corruption indices. Considering the estimates obtained using ICRG indices, we particularly focus on the signs and signicance of the corruption coecients in column (2): both Q2 and Q3 levels of ICRG corruption are associated with signicantly higher foreign ownership while Q4 corruption coecients remain insignicant. When we use TI corruption index, only Q2 level of corruption is signicant while Q3 and Q4 remain insignicant in determining percentage of foreign ownership. In other words, there is no evidence from this analysis that corruption necessarily lowers foreign ownership in our sample. In contrast, results suggest that some degree of low to moderate levels of corruption (Q2, Q3) is associated with signicantly higher foreign ownership until corruption is too high. It is with respect to Q4 (for ICRG index) and Q3 and Q4 for (TI index) we nd that corruption does not bear a signicant impact on the size of foreign ownership. We argue that this insignicance can be attributed to an indierence where costs of corruption may exactly outweigh the returns from foreign investment at a higher level of corruption.
Robustness check: Wooldridge estimates highlight that there is signicant self-selection in our sample arising from the selective foreign entry, thus rendering uncorrected estimates of foreign ownership to be irrelevant. Next we proceed to compare Wooldridge panel xed eects estimates of foreign ownership with the corresponding pooled Tobit and Heckman selection estimates commonly used in the literature: while both of these alternative models allow for some selection correction, they do not take account of the within rm variation in outcomes over time. These estimates are summarised in Table 5 . It is noteworthy that pooled tobit identies a signicant negative eect of Q3 host corruption, while the corresponding eect is negative but not signicant in the pooled Heckman model. In contrast, the eect is positive and statistically signicant in panel FE Wooldridge model. Similar eect is obtained with respect to Q4 value of host corruption. We argue that this Wooldridge corrected estimates are superior to these alternative estimates, as none of these alternative estimates control for rm xed-eects and as such are likely to suer from the omitted variable bias.
Accordingly, exploiting the within rm variation in foreign ownership over time, the selectivity corrected Wooldridge point estimates for percentage foreign ownership are 2.26 and 1.81 higher when ICRG corruption indices are respectively at its Q2 and Q3 levels. In other words, one standard deviation increase in Q2 level of corruption is associated with 1% higher foreign ownership; the corresponding gure is about 0.78% for one standard deviation increase in Q3 level of corruptin. However, the signicantly favourable eect of corruption for foreign ownership vanishes when ICRG corruption is at Q4 (i.e., when the index is greater than 4). The insignicance of the Q4 corruption coecient may pertain to a case when the costs of corruption loom large and exactly outweigh the returns from foreign investment. Given that these estimates are obtained after controlling for rm and year specic xed eects and also possible selectivity bias, we argue that these estimates provide the causal eects of corruption on percentage foreign ownership in our sample.
Role of Networking-selectivity corrected FE-OLS estimates of foreign ownership
We next test the validity of the networking hypothesis with a view to explore its link with non-linear corruption-foreign ownership relationship. Table 6 summarises the corrected estimates of foreign ownership where we augment the basic model shown in Table 4 by including the networking arguments: homehost networking link (EU, OECD or both), and also low absolute dierence in home and host corruption. In order to nd out the dierential eects of corruption in these cases, if any, we also interact these networking factors with the levels of host corruption Q2, Q3, Q4. These estimates are summarsied in Table  6 .
As before, the selection correction term lambda is statistically signicant and negative in each column of the table, thus justifying the use of the two-step corrected Wooldridge FE estimates of percentage foreign ownership. Each specication (1)-(5) augment Table 4 specications by including various networking arguments individually/jointly and also their interactions with the host corruption quartiles. First, column (1) tests if rms from source countries with similar level of corruption as CEE host countries (i.e., when the dierence in host and home relative corruption is low) tend to have higher foreign ownership in a host country. To this end, we include a dummy rc_q1 that takes a value 1 if the distance between home and host corruption is less than or equal to the Q1 value of the variable 1.5; otherwise the variable takes a value 0. While rc_q1 per se is not statistically signicant in our sample, its interactions with Q2 and Q3 levels of host corruption are positive and signicant. These estimates suggest that parent rms from home countries with similar level of corruption as that of a host country would hold signicantly higher foreign ownership in our sample, even when host corruption increases from Q1 to Q2 and then to Q3. Note however that the interaction term is no longer signicant for Q4 level of host corruption so that the signicant positive eect of institutional similarity between host and home country vanishes.
Next we consider if networking between EU, OECD and/or both EU and OECD home-host link would signicantly boost foreign ownership when host corruption is high. To this end, we create 3 dummy variables: EU_EU=1 if both source and host countries are EU members; OECD_OECD=1 if if both source and host countries are OECD members and also both_EU_OECD=1 if both home and host countries are EU or OECD members. We also create interactions between these binary EU/OECD link membership variables and Q2, Q3, Q4 levels of host corruption, with a view to explore if the signicance of host corruption vanishes in these cases of networking between EU/OECD home and host countries. Columns (2)-(4) show the corrected Wooldridge foreign ownership estimates as we respectively consider EU-EU, OECD-OECD and both EU and OECD home-host links. As expected, EU_EU link is positive and signicant (column 2) while OECD_OECD link (column 3) is not. However when we consider both EU and OECD link together as in column (4), the binary variable both_eu_oecd is positive and statistically signicant, thus suggesting that home-host EU/OECD networking may signicantly boost foreign ownership in our sample. Also, note that none of the interaction terms between networking and host corruption (Q2, Q3, Q4) is statistically signicant in columns (2)-(4); the latter suggests that the adverse eect of corruption vanishes when EU/OECD home countries invest in EU/OECD host countries.
Finally column (5) shows the estimates of foreign ownership when we augment column (4) specication by rc_q1 and also their interactions with host corruption quartiles Q2, Q3 and Q4. We also include control for common border and also its interaction with both_eu_oecd; as such this is the most complete specication that we prefer. As before, there is suggestion that the estimated interaction coecients are positive and signicant for Q2 and Q3 levels of corruption, but not when corruption is at its Q4 value. In other words, there is suggestion that foreign ownership increases signicantly when homehost corruption environment is similar. Second, the dummy for both_eu_oecd is positive and signicant so that foreign ownership is signicantly higher when both home and host countries are EU and/or OECD members. Further, the interaction terms between Q2 and Q3 levels of corruption are both positive, thus suggesting a positive association between Q2 and Q3 level of corruption when both home and host countries are EU/OECD members. However, the interaction with Q4 host corruption is dropped here. These estimates from the complete specication seem to corborate the corruption-foreign ownership relationship observed in Table 4 . Clearly, there is a signicant premium attached to institutional familiarity in our sample. The corresponding estimates using TI index of corruption are summarised in Appendix Table A2 turn out to be quite comparable to the estimates obtained by using ICRG corruption index, thus conrming the robustness of our foreign ownership estimates.
Appendix Table A3 additionally include host GDP and its annual growth rate. Host countries with greater GDP oer bigger market and hence may attract more foreign investment because the expected rates of return from this investment is likely to be higher. Similarly, host countries with greater economic growth rate oers greater potential for foreign investment. While log GDP is positive and statistically signicant in columns (1) and (2), GDP growth rate is positive, but statistically insignicant. Our central corruption results remain largely similar even when we include these additional controls, highlighting the signicant dierential eects of networking: institutional similarity and EU/OECD networking for Q2 and Q3 level of corruption. However, the etimated host corruption coecient turns out to be negative and signicant for Q3 level of corruption per se, while the corruption Q4 coecient remains statistically insignicant in both columns. Taken together the total eect of corruption when rc_q1=1 and also both home and host countries belong to EU/OECD turn out to be 5.428% and 4.113% (=-4.321+8.434) respectively for Q2 and Q3 levels ICRG corruption (where we consider only the signicant and relevant estimated coecients corruption, corruption*rc_q1 and corruption*both_eu_oecd). The corresponding eects for CPI corruption index turn out to be 5.941% and 4.248% respectively for Q2 and Q3 levels of CPI corruption. Clearly, these eects are more than double than what we found in Table 4 : one standard deviation increase in corruption Q2 will be associated with 2.446% higher foreign ownership; the corresponding gure for corruption Q3 will be associated with 1.77% higher foreign ownership. Nevertheless, the underlying corruption-foreign ownership relationship remains non-linear around corruption quartile Q4.
Choice between sole foreign subsidiary vs. joint venturessome corrected estimates
Our data show that the average foreign ownership is very high among the rms with some foreign ownership in almost all host countries. It is as high as 89% in the Czech Republic while the lowest gure is 58% in Ukraine. Hence, on average, foreign investors tend to have absolute majority ownership rights in sample rms. The actual control rights of foreign investors may not be much dierent when they have 90% cash ow rights and when they have 60% cash ow rights. In an attempt to compare our results with Javorcik and Wei, we next estimate two more specications. First, we construct a binary indicator for sole foreign subsidiary FO_SS. The variable takes a value 1 if foreign ownership is greater than or equal to 90% and zero otherwise (the value of the variable is missing for rms with less than or equal to 1% foreign ownership). Second, we not only classify foreign-owned rms into wholly-owned (SS) vs. joint ventures (JV), but also distinguish joint ventures into majority foreign-owned (51-99.99) and minority foreign-owned (10-50.99). Accordingly, we construct a categorical variable FO as follows: FO = 3 if SS = 2 if majority JV = 1 if minority JV = 0 if foreign ownership <=9.99%, but greater than 1% Naturally, we estimate a binary probit model to determine FO_SS while an ordered probit model to determine FO, since FO is ordered by construction (in terms of the underlying threshold parameters ρ 1 , ρ 2 and ρ 3 ). In both cases, we considered pooled estimates of these variables for the period 2002-08 and include as many control variables as possible so that the omitted variable bias is minimised. As before, we use a set of lagged explanatory variables which not only includes X as in equation 1, but also includes natural logarithm of GDP and its growth rate to account for the potential gain from investing in the host country. Further we control for sector and year controls to account for sector-and year-level variation in foreign ownership. Since we focus on the rms with foreign ownership greater than 1%, we also need to correct for the selection arising from the likelihood of foreign entry. A positive estimated coecient would indicate a higher liklihood of SS while a negative coecient would indicate a tendency in favour of JV.
The corrected estimates of the complete model are summarised in columns (1) -(4) of Table 7 : while columns (1)- (2) show the estimates for FO_SS, those in (3)-(4) show those for FO, respectively using ICRG and TI indices. In each case we use the nal specication as shown in column (5) of Table 6 . First, we nd that all the estimated coecients of various corruption quartiles are negative, but only the estimated Q3 coecients are negative and signicant for both FO specications. Thus, the likelihood of foreign SS is lower when host corruption is at Q3 level, thus suggesting that the corresponding probability of JV is higher at Q3 level of corruption. Second we consider the dierential eects of corruption when there is home-host institutional familiarity. In this respect, we nd that the likelihood of SS is signicantly higher for both Q2 and Q3 levels of corruption when the relative distance in home-host corruption levels is small (i.e., similar corruption levels in home and host countries). Finally, we consider the premium for home-host match in EU/OECD membership. Clearly, the dummy for both_eu_oecd is positive and signicant, thus suggesting that the likelihood of SS increases signicantly when both host and home countries are members of EU or OECD. Further all the interaction terms of both_eu_oecd with the corruption quartiles are positive, but none of them being statistically signicant. As such, there is some conrmation that the level of corruption does not matter much when both home-host countries are members of EU/OECD. Further, we nd that these results are not sensitive to the choice of corruption measures, ICRG or TI. Also the corresponding ordered probit estimates of FO shown in columns (3)-(4) are rather similar.
As such, there are similarities and dierences in our results from Javorcik and Wei (2009) who found that the likelihood of JV is higher in corrupt host countries, except in the case of technically sosticated rms. We nd that, ceteris paribus, Q3 corruption is associated with lower likelihood of SS and therefore higher likelihood of JV. Also our estimates control for sector xed eects and as such these estimates refer to within sector variation; we were unable to nd any sector-specic eect for technologically sosticated rms as in Javorcik and Wei (2009) . Following Szulanski (1996) , we argue that the additional costs of leakage associated with JV may not only be pertinent for technologically sosticated rms but also for rms in other sectors, involving inter-organisational knowledge transfer with respect to both technology and management (see discussion in the introduction). Further, we show that the strength of this relationship between corruption and mode of entry may be weakened when one takes account of the networking arguments, which enhance the likelihood of SS at low to moderate levels of corruption, thus highlighting the value added of our results. Finally, the underlying cause of most joint ventures pertain to a desire among partners to access and/or pool markets, capital, technologies and/or skills (Miller et al. 1997 ). The fact that each party wants something the other party has, means that each will want dierent things from JV and the need may change quickly over time. As such, the perceived value of a local partner may decline over time as the foreign partner learns more about their host country operations. In other words, costs of JV may increase over time while that of SS may decline as the foreign owner gains experience. Accordingly, an analaysis of JV and SS may be captured better in a pooled/panel data-set rather than in a single cross-section data (e.g., that analysed by Javorcik and Wei (2009)). Further, unlike SS, a successful collaboration in JV may require discarding old ideas and practices (Szulanski, 1996) , which may cause some stickiness in the inter-organisational knowledge transfer with respect to both technology and management. Taken together, the value attached to SS may be higher than that for JV over a period of time and this eect is likely to be stronger when the foreign investor is familiar with the institutions in the host country (either because of low home-host corruption distance and/or EU/OECD membership rules). This is what is borne out in our data, thus adding value to the literature.
Conclusions
Despite corruption and governance concerns in corrupt host economies, no one can deny that a large amount of FDI ows to countries with high corruption and imperfect governance including those in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. In this context, we re-examine the relationship beween corruption and foreign entry and foreign ownership in a sample of CEE host countries and identify a possible non-linear relationship, if any, beween host corruption and foreign ownership in a sample of CEE countries. It is argued here that returns may exceed the costs of foreign investment at low to medium level of corrution and as such corruption may not deter foreign entry/ownership. However at a high level of corruption, costs may exceed or exactly outweigh the returns, thus giving rise to a negative or even an insignicant relationship between corruption and foreign ownership. Further, we hypothesize that a possible reason for this non-linearity may be linked to strategies adopted by foreign multinationals, e.g., investing in more familiar environment (e.g., choosing host countries with similar level of corruption as theirs and/or formal networking with EU/OECD countries) in a bid to minimise the costs of foreign investment in an unfamiliar host environment.
Results using a large home-host matched panel data from a group of CEE host countries over 2002-08 appear to provide some support to our central hypotheses. We use Wooldrige (1995) selectivity corrected panel xed eects estimates of foreign ownership to minimise the rm-specic omitted variable bias after correcting for the selectivity bias arising from foreign entry decision . First, we nd that any level of corruption may not necessarily harm foreign entry and/or size of foreign ownership in our sample though the favourable effect of corruption may disappear when corruption is too high. In particular, after correcting for the selectivity bias, we nd that Q2 and Q3 levels of corruption are associated with higher foreign ownership though the relationship loses its signicance at Q4 level of corruption. We next examine the validity of the networking hypothesis and nd some support in our sample. In particular, there is suggestion that Q2 and Q3 levels of host corruption are associated with signicantly higher foreign ownership when the home-host corruption distance is small and also when foreign multinationals from EU/OECD countries invest in EU/OECD host countries in the region. When we compare our results with those of Javorcik and Wei (2009), we nd that Q3 level of corruption is associated with lower likelihood of SS, thus favouring JV for rms within a sector. However, we were unable to detect a dierential eect for technologically sosticated rms in our sample. The latter can be atributed to the fact that costs of JV may not only petain to technology transfer, but also to transfer of management strategy which may not be concentrated in one sector only. Further, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of SS increases at low to moderate levels of corruption, when the home-host corruption distance is low and also when there is home-host match in EU/OECD membership. We also argue that the strength of the corrupton-mode of foreign entry relationship would be higher when one has data over a period of time, thus adding further value to our analysis.
It is often argued that openness and globalisation may reduce corrupt domestic practices (Sung and Chu, 2003; Dahlstrom, 2012) . Our results however highlight how parent rms may adopt alternative mechanisms to minimise the potential investment risks in more corrupt host environment, thus questioning the view whether globalization may necessarily lower the level of host corruption. While this is a study of the CEE region, it would be interesting to replicate our study for the countries beyond the region dened by our sample boundaries. We hope future research will address this. Source: Author's calculation using the sample.
All monetary values are deflated and expressed in thousands of US dollars.
Common border is a dummy that takes a value 1 if home country is bordering the host country; it is 0 otherwise.
Openness is measured by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP ratio; source: World Development Indicators EBRD infrastructure index EBRD competition policy index Local polynomial smooth
